This paper presents the interruptible electricity market Stackelberg game model of load under the contract in consideration, and the use of Monte Carlo solves the uncertainty of electric power demand simulation technology, the simulation proved that the interruptible load contract, and the interruption threshold reasonably can reduce the equilibrium price and volatility effect.
INTRODUCTION
Under the background of rapid development of new energy and smart grid in the world today, the demand response of electric power is paid more and more attention and application [1] [2] [3] [4] . Interruptible load management is one of the important measures of demand response [5] [6] [7] [8] . When the wholesale price of the market is too high or the energy resources are in short supply, the user can break or reduce the load according to the terms of the contract to ease the tension [9] [10] [11] . As the leader of the electricity market, generation companies have the ability to dominate the market [12] [13] [14] . Therefore, it is important to study the behavior of generators and predict the equilibrium of electricity market [15] [16] . This paper established a Stackelberg game model in the wholesale market, which is based on market demand ________________________ for the original model considering the interruptible load contract, and the market demand model based on the wholesale market building Stackelberg model. The original market model is no longer smooth, so a new method for solving the equilibrium solution is needed. This paper determined by Monte Carlo simulation technique to deal with the power demand, finally the simulation results validate the efficiency.
DEMAND FUNCTION OF GENERATORS CONSIDERING INTERRUPTIBLE LOAD
In the future T (1 hour), in the power market of generation company and users signed a contract of interruptible load, which indicate the interruptible load is Q , and the provisions of outage threshold price for 0 k . V is a part of the Q interrupt load. The power demand curve is shown in formula (1) .
STACKELBERG DYNAMIC GAME MODEL OF POWER MARKET CONSIDERING INTERRUPTIBLE LOAD CONTRACT
Suppose there is a T (1 hour) in the future, there are interruptible load contracts in the electricity market, and there are n generators, and the load demand D is expressed as formula (1) . The cost of the generator i is shown in the following formula (2).
In formula (2): i q is the power generation amount of i generator in T time; i c and i a are constants greater than zero and cost factor. The generation companies in the electricity market are divided into two categories: one is the leading electricity supplier, the number of which is 1 N , and the electricity price is 1 p . The other is the follow-up producer, whose number is 2 N , the electricity price is set to 2 p . Ignoring the constraints of the transmission network, the profit function of each generator i is same, such as the formula (3). ) (
The decision problem in the wholesale market can be described as the maximization of the run problem.
SOLVING METHOD The First Kind of Situation
If the price is less than 0 k , which satisfy the assumptions of 0 k p  , p is the first category of the equilibrium solution, there is no implementation of interruptible load contract, so the interruptible load will not affect the result of market equilibrium. q in the first stage, and the trailing power supplier selects * 2 q in the second stage, which is the only sub refining Nash equilibrium of the dynamic game. The balance between supply and demand can be seen in formula (10) .
Second Types of Situations
Suppose the wholesale price of electricity market is
. The method of equilibrium solution is similar to the situation one, so the equilibrium power generation and the equilibrium price of power market are the lower ones. 
. And in the future T (1 hour) market, the interruptible load is Q , and the interruption threshold price is 0 k . A obeys the normal distribution whose mean value is 190MW and the variance is  , and the sample number is set to 10000.
The Influence of Interruptible Load on Market Equilibrium
Suppose the interrupt threshold price is
, the effects of interruptible load on the mean and standard deviation of the market are shown in figure 2 and figure 3 . The test results show that the implementation of interruptible load contract, The test results show that the price fluctuation decreases and the smaller the demand elasticity is, the more obvious the effect is when the interruptible load contract is executed. 
The Impact of Disruption Threshold Price on Market Equilibrium
Now suppose Figure 4 is the curve of the output and profit of the generator 1 with the change of k . From the results, it can be concluded that the increase of the interruption threshold price will reduce the probability of the execution contract, but when the threshold value of the interruption is too large, the contract will not be executed, so the k value will not affect the power generation and profit of the generator. So it is very important to set reasonable interrupt threshold. Figure 5 and Figure 6 shows that with the decrease in the market price interruptible threshold price, mean and standard deviation will be decreased. 
CONCLUSIONS
When the electricity market, interruptible load contract can significantly reduce the market price and the price fluctuation inhibition, especially when the market uncertainty increase or reduce power the market price elasticity coefficient, the effect is more significant. The future of new energy generation will be more and more wide open; these power plants will lead to the market demand uncertainty, so this research has practical significance. The appropriate choice of the threshold price can reduce the wholesale market price more effectively and restrain the price volatility effectively.
